
Houston experienced a great deal of difficulty controlling his small army throughout the San Jacinto campaign, as it was steeped in the militia tradition of the United States. Resembling more an armed mob than an army, these volunteers insisted on a democratic approach to the decision-making process, something Houston was unable, or unwilling to accommodate. As a result, Houston faced a great deal of antipathy from these men, who considered him too secretive and authoritarian for their tastes. Despite this tension, Houston managed to keep his ill-disciplined force together just long enough to defeat Santa Anna. Unfortunately, his wound forced him to leave the army at the moment of his greatest popularity, denying it any possible restraining influence he now possessed.
Houston’s replacement was Thomas J. Rusk, who reluctantly resigned his position as secretary of war in President Burnet’s cabinet before assuming command of the army. Brigadier General Rusk was faced with some sobering realities upon assuming command. In the wake of San Jacinto the bulk of the army (never large to begin with), left to return to their homes and families. Most, if not all, of these men were Texas settlers who fought just long enough to defend their land and families. The remainder of the army was composed of recently arrived volunteers, (many of whom had arrived after the battle, but all of whom were promised generous land bounties) who were anxious for some type of action against Mexico. Unlike the Texans who had left the army, these men joined the service in search of glory and riches, both of which were in short supply. This situation was exasperated by a dearth of supplies. The lack of provisions and equipment plagued the army throughout its existence and served as a source of constant resentment toward the government.
Rusk vainly attempted to get more material from the government, while at the same time officers within the army began to agitate toward an invasion of Mexico – action which the government was totally opposed. The army began to see itself as ill-treated and a number of agitators begin to call for redress.
The situation was exacerbated by the actions of Thomas Jefferson Green, who arrived in Texas on 4 June 1836. Green, a self-styled military man, and 130 volunteers arrived at Velasco Harbor just as the Texan government was set to release Santa Anna. President Burnet, in an attempt to abide by the stipulations of the Treaty of Velasco, was in the process placing El Presidente on board the Texas man-of-war Invincible when Green and his men steamed into harbor. Upon hearing of the imminent departure of the Mexican leader, Green boarded the Invincible and dragged Santa Anna ashore in manacles while a mob on the beach shouted in support.
Burnet and his cabinet managed to keep the mob from lynching Santa Anna, but he was spirited away by a detail under the command of Captain William H. Patton. Santa Anna remained at Orizimbo, the plantation home of Dr. James Phelps, until October 1836, when he was released by newly-elected President Houston. Burnet was furious and embarrassed by the army’s interference, and felt that the arrest cost Texas international recognition. This recognition was crucial to the economic interests of the republic, for without recognition financial loans would not be forthcoming, making an already bleak economic situation even bleaker. More importantly, the affair demonstrated the army’s willingness to interfere in the functions of the civil government.
Green’s actions were cheered by General Rusk and the army, but Rusk was tired of his command and recommended that Green replace him. However, new threats from Mexico appeared and Rusk was determined to remain in command until the crisis was dealt with. The problems with keeping his men fed, supplied, and paid were exasperated with arrival of more volunteers all who displayed a decided unwillingness to obey orders. Led by Memucan Hunt, Felix Huston, and James Pickney Henderson, none of these men possessed military training, and all perceived their positions as opportunities for future political and commercial advancement rather than as a duty to the nation.
President Burnet took Rusk’s request for replacement at face value and appointed Mirabeau Lamar to command the army with the rank of major general on 25 June. For bravery at San Jacinto Lamar received a battlefield promotion from private to colonel and command of the Texan cavalry from Sam Houston. He had most recently served as the Secretary of War and was a popular figure in Texas. Unfortunately for the government, upon Lamar’s arrival at Victoria (headquarters of the army) he was received not as a commander, but rather as a usurper, and the army refused to accept him.
After Rusk ordered a parade of his troops in honor of Lamar, Brigadier General Felix Huston countermanded the order asking Lamar what right the government had to replace General Rusk who held the confidence of the army and the people. Lamar, astutely recognizing the opposition he faced, determined to address the troops, giving a rousing speech to the army. However, when he finished Rusk, Green and Huston all spoke against his assuming command. Lamar refused to let the matter rest and determined to put the matter to a vote, which ended with 179 votes in his favor and 1,500 in opposition. Instead, the army chose Felix Huston as its commander. The situation was resolved when Rusk withdrew his request for relief and Lamar left the army.
Surprisingly, the dissension and lack of discipline grew much worse after Lamar’s departure. The army to fractionalized between supporters of Rusk and Huston, with most of the new men supporting Huston over Rusk. As the army began to swell with even more volunteers, the government’s ability to feed and equip it remained the same as it had for the last two months, and the army came increasingly under the sway of agitators Green and Huston. Neither officers nor enlisted men demonstrated any strong sense of obligation to a frequently strife-torn government that did not supply them well, nor did they display much patriotism for a land they had just entered.
This situation came to a head when the refractory element of the army (led by Green and Huston and upset over the Lamar incident and the disposition of Santa Anna), hatched a plan to arrest President Burnet in mid-July. In a document of remarkable audacity a group chaired by Felix Huston filed charges against President Burnet, accusing him of “assuming powers not delegated to him” and “sowing the seeds of discord”. The “junta” chose Lt. Colonel Henry Millard, who was then sent with a guard to arrest Burnet at Velasco (current seat of the government) and convey him back to camp for a trial as enemy of the country.
Despite Millard’s efforts to keep the mission secret, one of his men got drunk along the way and boasted that his party was on its way to arrest the president. At the same time, Millard met up with Major Amasa Turner from his regiment and ordered the junior officer to proceed to Velasco, arrest Burnet, and secure all of the papers of the government. Millard choice of Turner was a poor one. Upon arriving in Velasco, Turner, a friend of Burnet’s, asked him to go for a walk and notified him of the plot. The citizens and Captain James C. Allen of the Buckeye Rangers, now alerted to the plot by the drunken soldier, promised to protect the president. Thus was Texas perilously near to the establishment of a military dictatorship.
Had the plotters been successful the possible implications of such an outcome are serious in the extreme. The Republic of Texas would have lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the world, possibly becoming less attractive for a future annexation with the United States, and no doubt would have precipitated open conflict once again with Mexico. As the Republic was in no way prepared to fight Mexico, the experiment in Texan independence might well have ended quickly. The borders of Mexico and the United States might be quite different now and one can only guess at how the histories of these two countries would have changed.

